Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– )
2016

Neal K. Ostler, Appellant/Petitioner, vs. Utah St Ate Retirement
Board, Appellee/Respondent.
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3
Part of the Law Commons

Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Ostler vs State Retirement, No. 20160220 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2016).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca3/3655

This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals Briefs (2007– ) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital
Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/
utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

IN THE UT AH COURT OF APPEALS

NEAL K. OSTLER,
Appellant/Petitioner,
CASE NO. 20160220-CA
vs.
Agency Case No. 13-25R
UTAH ST ATE RETIREMENT BOARD,
Appellee/Respondent.

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
UTAH STATE RETIREMENT BOARD

APPEAL FROM THE UT AH ST ATE RETIREMENT BOARD

Florence M. Vincent
PRINCE, YEA TES & GELDZAHLER
15 W. South Temple, Suite 1700
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
Attorney for Appellant

Erin T. Middleton
Assistant Solicitor General
Sean D. Reyes
Utah Attorney General
160 East 300 South, Fifth Floor
P.O. Box 140858
Salt Lake City, UT 84114-0858
Attorneys for Appellee
Salt Lake Community College

David B. Hansen [8197]
Erin L. Gill [13010]
560 East 200 South
Salt Lake City, UT 84102
dave.hansen@urs.org
erin.gill@urs.org
Associate General Counsel
UT AH RETIREMENT SYSTEMS
Attorneys for Appellee

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

LIST OF PARTIES
Neal K. Ostler
Petitioner/Appellant
Utah State Retirement Board
Respondent/Appellee
Salt Lake Community College
Third Party Respondent/Appellee

11

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

TABLE OF CONTENTS
LIST OF PARTIES .............................................................................................................. ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS .................................................................................................. iii

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................... V
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ................................................................................... 1
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW ......................................... 1
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS ........................................................... 2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE .......................................................................................... 4
SUMMARY OF THE FACTS ......................................................................................... 10
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT ............................................................................... 13
ARGUMENT ..................................................................................................................... 17

I.

II.

THE BOARD CORRECTLY DETERMINED UNDER UT AH LAW
THAT OSTLER FORFEITED ALL SERVICE CREDIT BASED ON THE
REFUND OF HIS MEMBER CONTRIBUTIONS AND WAS
THEREFORE NOT ELIGIBLE FOR A RETIREMENT ALLOWANCE ............ 17
A.

OSTLER CANNOT QUALIFY FOR A RETIREMENT BENEFIT
THAT DOES NOT EXIST UNDER THE ACT ......................................... 17

B.

EVEN IF THE ACT IS FOUND TO BE AMBIGUOUS, THE
BOARD'S INTERPRETATION SHOULD PREVAIL ............................. 22

C.

THE BOARD CORRECTLY REJECTED OSTLER'S OTHER
LEGAL AND POLICY ARGUMENTS ..................................................... 24

THE BOARD CORRECTLY DISMISSED OSTLER'S CLAIMS
AGAINST SLCC AS TIME-BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE THREEYEAR ST ATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR LACHES .......................................... 28

111

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

A.

B.

THE BOARD CORRECTLY DETERMINED THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS BEGAN TO RUN AT THE TIME RETIREMENT
CONTRIBUTIONS SHOULD HA VE BEEN MADE TO URS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH UT AH LAW ........................................................ 28

e

THE BOARD ALSO CORRECTLY DETERMINED THAT
OSTLER'S CLAIMS ARE BARRED BY THE DOCTRINE OF
LACHES ...................................................................................................... 39

CONCLUSION .................................................................................................................. 41
CERTIFICATE OF COMPLIANCE ................................................................................. 42
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE .......................................................................................... 43
ADDENDUM I -BOARD RESOLUTION 2013-04 ...................................................... 44
ADDENDUM 2 - UTAH CODE ANN.§ 49-11-613.5 (2016) ....................................... .45

iv

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Gt

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Federal Cases
Miller v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co.,
475 F.3d 516 (3d Cir. 2007) .......................................................................... 15, 34
Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency,
Inc., 321 U.S. 342 (1944) .................................................................................... 38
State Cases
Anderson v. Doms,
1999 UT App 207, 984 P.2d 392 .......................................................................... 2
Aris Vision Inst., Inc. v. Wasatch Prop. Mgmt., Inc.,
2006 UT 45, 143 P.3d 278 ............................................................................ 17, 22
Bailey v. Shelby County,
2013 WL 2149734 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) .................................................... 15, 34
Bd. of Educ. ofJordan Sch. Dist. v. Sandy City Corp.,
2004 UT 37, 94 P.3d 234 .................................................................................... 17
Bordwine v. Okla. Firefighters Pension and Ret. Sys.,
99 P.3d 703 (Okla. Civ. App. 2004) ................................................................... 36
Bowles v. Wash. Dept. of Ret. Sys.,
847 P.2d 440 (Wash. 1993) ................................................................................. 36
Cal. Teachers' Ass 'n v. Governing Bd.,
169 Cal.App.3d 35 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985) ............................................................ 35
Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop,
2007 UT 25, 156 P.3d 806 .................................................................................... 1
Eldredge v. Utah State Ret. Bd.,
795 P .2d 671 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) .................................................................... 39
Epperson v. Utah State Ret. Bd.,
949 P.2d 779 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) .................................................................... 38
Fishbein v. State ex rel. Louisiana State Univ. Health Sciences Ctr.,
898 So.2d 1260 (La. 2005) ............................................................................ l 5, 34
Flowell Elec. Ass 'n, Inc. v. Rhodes Pump,
2015 UT 87,361 P.3d 91 .................................................................................... 32
Fundamentalist Church ofJesus Christ of Latter-Day Saints v. Home,
2012 UT 66,289 P.3d 502 ............................................................................ 16, 39
Harold Selman, Inc. v. Box Elder County,
2011 UT 18,251 P.3d 804 .................................................................................. 27
Horton v. Utah State Ret. Bd.,
842 P .2d 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) .................................................................... 3 7
Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc.,
679 P .2d 903 (Utah 1984) ................................................................................... 18
Jensen v. Young,
2010 UT 67, 245 P.3d 731 .................................................................................... 1

V

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Jerz v. Salt Lake County,
822 P.2d 770 (Utah 1991) ................................................................................... 18
Jiricek v. Woonsocket Sch. Dist. #55-4,
489 N. W.2d 348 (S.D. 1992) ........................................................................ 15, 33
Kramer v. State Ret. Bd.,
2008 UT App 351, 195 P.3d 925 ........................................................................ 26
Lane v. Non-Teacher Sch. Employee Ret. Sys. of Missouri,
174 S.W.3d 626 (Mo.App. W.D. 2005) ........................................................ 15, 34
Mariemont Corp. v. White City Water Imp. Dist.,
958 P .2d 222 (Utah 1998) ............................................................................. 13, 22
McLeod v. Utah State Ret. Bd.,
2011 UT App 190,257 P.3d 1090 ...................................................................... 37
Myers v. McDonald,
635 P.2d 84 (Utah 1981) ..................................................................................... 38
0 'Keefe v. Utah State Ret. Bd.,
929 P.2d 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) .................................................................. 37
Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp.,
911 P.2d 1290 (Utah 1996) ................................................................................. 17
Platts v. Parents Helping Parents,
947 P.2d 658 (Utah 1997) ............................................................................. 17, 22
Quick Safe-T Hitch, Inc. v. RSB Sys., L.C.,
2000 UT 84, 12 P.3d 577 .................................................................................... 35
Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson,
2005 UT 14, 108 P.3d 741 ...................................................................... 15, 30, 31
Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch.,
2006 UT 20, 133 P .3d 428 .................................................................................. 23
Seale v. Gowans,
923 P.2d 1361 (Utah 1996) ................................................................................. 35
Sindt v. Ret. Bd.,
2007 UT 16, 157 P.3d 797 .................................................................................... 1
State Employees' Ass 'n v. Belknap Cnty.,
448 A.2d 969 (N.H. 1982) .................................................................................. 35
State ex rel. Teamsters v. City of Youngstown,
364 N.E.2d 18 (Ohio 1977) ................................................................................. 35
State v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co.,
2002 UT 75, 52 P.3d 1257 ............................................................................ 32, 35
Steelman v. Okla. Police Pension and Ret. Sys.,
128 P.3d 1090 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005) ............................................................... 36
Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball,
786 P.2d 760 (Utah 1990) ..................................................................................... 2
View Condo. Owners Ass 'n v. MS/CO, L.L. C.,
2005 UT 91, 127 P.3d 697) (alterations in original) ........................................... 27

Vl

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Wagner v. B.F. Goodrich Co.,
1991 WL 184489 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991) ............................................................. 35
Wash. Educ. Ass 'n v. Wash. Dep 't of Ret. Sys.,
332 P.3d 439 (Wash. 2014) ................................................................................. 36
West Jordan City v. Goodman,
2006 UT 27, 135 P.3d 874 .................................................................................. 26
Whitaker v. Utah State Ret. Bd.,
2008 UT App 282,191 P.3d 814 ........................................................................ 37
State Statutes
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-102( 15), (31 ), (49) ........................................................... 2
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-l l-103(2) ............................................................................. 24
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-l l-201 .................................................................................... 4
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-203(1 )( c ), (g) .................................................................. 23
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-l l-401(3) ........................................................................... 2, 4
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-501(1), (5) .............................................................. 3, 6, 25
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-l l-502 ................................................................................ 3, 6
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-l l-502(l)(a), (l)(c), (3) ................................................... 8, 25
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-l l-601(3) ............................................................................. 40
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-l l-613 .................................................................................... 9
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613(7) ............................................................................... I
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-l l-613.5 ................................................................... .iv, 31, 45
Utah Code Ann. § 49-12-103 .................................................................................... 5
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-13-102(5)(a) ........................................................................ 32
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-13-103 .................................................................................... 5
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-13-401(1) ........................................................................... 8, 9
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-14-103 .................................................................................... 5
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-14-40l(l)(c) ........................................................................ 18
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-15-103 .................................................................................... 5
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-16-103 .................................................................................... 5
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-l 7-103 .................................................................................... 5
Utah Code Ann. § 49-18-103 .................................................................................... 5
Utah Code Ann. § 49-19-103 .................................................................................... 5
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-22-103 .................................................................................... 5
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-23-103 .................................................................................... 5
Utah Code Ann.§ 63G-4-403(4), (4)(d) ................................................................... l
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-305 ............................................................................. 3, 30
Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-305(4) ................................................................ 14, 28, 31
State Rules
Utah R. App.
Utah R. App.
Utah R. App.
Utah R. App.

P.
P.
P.
P.

14 .................................................................................................... l
24(a)(9) ......................................................................................... 26
24(f)(l) ......................................................................................... 42
27(b) ............................................................................................. 42
vii

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This Court has appellate jurisdiction over formal administrative proceedings of the
Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613(7),
§ 63G-4-403(l), § 78A-4-103(2)(a), and Rule 14 of the Utah Rules of Appellate
<ii}

Procedure.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
Issue No. 1: Whether the Board correctly interpreted and applied provisions
of the Retirement Act in rejecting Ostler's attempt to create an extra-statutory
retirement benefit?
An agency's interpretation and application of statute is typically reviewed "as a
question of law under the correction-of-error standard." Sindt v. Ret. Bd., 2007 UT 16, il
5, 157 P.3d 797. Relief will be granted "'only if, on the basis of the agency's record,
([.i

[we] determine[] that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced
[because] ... the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law."' Id. (quoting
Utah Code Ann. § 63G-4-403(4), (4)(d)) (alterations in original).

Issue No. 2: Whether the Board correctly determined that Ostler's claims
against his former employer Salt Lake Community College were barred by the
statute of limitations or laches?
'"The applicability of a statute of limitations [is a] question[] of law, which we
review for correctness."' Jensen v. Young, 2010 UT 67, il 10,245 P.3d 731 (quoting

Colosimo v. Roman Catholic Bishop, 2007 UT 25, il 11, 156 P .3d 806). "[T]the
determination of whether a party was prejudiced for purposes of the doctrine of laches is

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

a legal conclusion that we review for correctness, [but] we will not set aside a trial court's
findings of fact underlying that conclusion unless they are clearly erroneous." Anderson

v. Doms, 1999 UT App 207, 18,984 P.2d 392 (citing Sweeney Land Co. v. Kimball, 786
P.2d 760, 761 (Utah 1990)).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS

Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-102(15):
"'Contributions' means the total amount paid by the participating
employer and the member into a system .... "

Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-102(31):
"Member contributions" means the sum of the contributions paid to a
system ... , including refund interest if allowed by a system, and which
are made by:
(a) the member; and
(b) the participating employer on the member's behalf under Section
4 l 4(h) of the Internal Revenue Code.

Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-102(49) (emphasis added):
"Service credit" means:
(a) the period during which an employee is employed and compensated
by a participating employer and meets the eligibility requirements
for membership in a system ... , provided that any required
contributions are paid to the office; and
(b) periods of time otherwise purchasable under this title.

Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-401(3):
In the accrual of service credit, the following provisions apply:
(a) A person employed and compensated by a participating employer
who meets the eligibility requirements for membership in a system
... shall receive service credit for the term of the employment
provided that all required contributions are paid to the office.

2
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Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-501 (in relevant part):
( 1) If a member shall for any cause, except retirement, permanent or
temporary disability, or death, terminate employment with a
participating employer the member may leave the member
contributions in the fund or may receive a refund of the member
contributions as provided under this section.

( 5) A member who receives a refund of member contributions forfeits
the service credit based on those contributions.

Utah Code Ann.§ 49-11-502 (in relevant part):
(1) (a) If a member receives a refund of member contributions and is
subsequently reemployed in a position covered by a system ... , the
participating employer or the member may redeposit an amount
equal to the member contributions refunded and interest charged
under Section 49-11-503.
(b) The interest shall be compounded annually from the date of
refund through the month of payment.
(c) If a redeposit is made, service credit shall be restored to
the member's account and credited to the same system ...
from which the refund was taken.

(3) A member who redeposits a refund of member contributions under
this section shall receive the amount of service credit forfeited in
taking the refund.

Utah Code Ann.§ 78B-2-305:
An action may be brought within three years:

re:,,

•

(4) for a liability created by the statutes of this state, other than
for a penalty or forfeiture under the laws of this state, except
where in special cases a different limitation is prescribed by
the statutes of this state; ....

3
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE

I.

NATURE OF THE CASE AND THE PARTIES
A. Utah Retirement Systems
The following is a brief explanation of the operations of the Utah Retirement

Systems under the provisions of the Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act in
order to assist the Court in understanding why the Utah State Retirement Board's
decision must be affirmed. The Utah Retirement Systems is created and governed by
Utah Code Title 49, the Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act (the
"Retirement Act" or "Act"). The Utah Legislature enacted the Retirement Act in order to
provide a comprehensive system of retirement and health insurance benefits to state and
local public employees throughout the State of Utah. The Legislature created within the
Retirement Act an administrative office-the Utah State Retirement Office, also known
as the Utah Retirement Systems (the "Retirement Office" or "URS"), and a governing
body-the Utah State Retirement Board (the "Retirement Board" or "Board"). See Utah
Code Ann. §§ 49-11-201, -202. The Board, in conjunction with participating employers
@

and members, maintains the systems on an actuarially sound basis and promotes
uniformity in the administration of the systems. See id.§ 49-11-203. The systems are
administered as qualified plans under the Internal Revenue Code in order for the
members and employers to enjoy favorable tax advantages for the benefits.
Membership in URS is based upon qualifying employment with a participating
public employer. See, e.g., id. § 49-11-401 (3 ). Employees are enrolled by their
employer with URS, and they participate in either or both a defined benefit (pension)

4
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plan and a defined contribution (401 (k), etc.) plan. In a defined benefit plan, service
Ei)

credit accrues over time, and once the employee is eligible to retire, they must file an
application, and a monthly retirement allowance is calculated based on the number of
years worked and the final average salary. A member cannot qualify for a retirement
benefit until they have accrued at least four years of service credit. See, e.g., § 49-13-

401 (1 )(C)(i).

•

Depending on the date of first employment and nature of the employment, each
employee participates in one or more of the distinct retirement "systems" contained in the
Act, each of which is designated for one or more of various categories of public
employees, including general public employees, public safety, firefighters, judges, and
governors and legislators. See Utah Code Ann.§ 49-12-103, § 49-13-103, § 49-14-103, §
49-15-103, § 49-16-103, § 49-17-103, § 49-18-103, § 49-19-103, § 49-22-103, and§ 4923-103. The systems are either "contributory" or "noncontributory" retirement systems.
A contributory system is funded by contributions from both the participating employer
and the member, while a noncontributory system requires no member contributions and is
funded solely through contributions from the participating employer. See, e.g., id. § 4913-301 , § 4 9-14-3 0 1.
Member and employer contributions are distinct, not only based upon by whom
they are paid, but also by how they are attributed to the member. Member contributions
vest immediately to the member and are nonforfeitable. See id.§ 49-14-301(5)(c).
Consequently, under the Act, members who have participated in a contributory system
may, upon termination of employment, choose to either receive a refund of their member

5
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contributions or leave those contributions with the fund to potentially receive a retirement
allowance. See id. § 49-11-501 ( 1). If the member chooses to receive a refund of their
member contributions, the service credit in the system is forfeited. See id. § 49-11501 (5). However, the member may redeposit the amount of the refund with interest in
order to reinstate the forfeited service credit. See id. § 49-11-502.
In contrast, the Act does not provide a mechanism for members to obtain a benefit
from employer contributions alone in a contributory system. Under the Act, employer
contributions are not specifically vested to an individual member. They are held in trust
for the purpose of paying costs and administering the systems. See id. § 49-11-301(3)
{"The assets of the funds are for the exclusive benefit of the members, participants, and
covered individuals and may not be diverted or appropriated for any purpose other than
that pennitted by this title.") Much like employer-paid insurance premiums, the fact that
retirement contributions are paid allows a member to qualify for a benefit, but the
member has no claim upon the paid amounts themselves and only receives a benefit to
the extent the member otherwise qualifies under the terms of the plan (in insurance, by
suffering a loss or incurring a claim, and in retirement, by meeting the conditions to retire
or otherwise receive payment of a benefit).
The Act requires the Board to certify employer contribution rates annually to
maintain the systems, plans, and programs on a financially and actuarially sound basis.
Each year, the actuary recommends contribution rates to the Board that are based on
actuarial assumptions and methods, the Board's funding policy, valuation of plan
liabilities and assets, and a review of actual plan experience. The calculation of

6
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•

contribution rates by URS' actuary is based on such assumptions and experience,
including employees who leave public employment, take a refund of their member
contributions, and forfeit service credit. Thus, the Board and URS carefully administer
the systems according to the Act, other applicable law, and fiduciary and actuarial
principles.

B. Neal K. Ostler
Ostler was a member of a contributory system, specifically, the Public Safety
Contributory Retirement System ("Public Safety Contributory System"), due to his
employment with the Salt Lake County Sheriffs Office and the Department of
Corrections between August 1972 and August 1988. R. 725. As a member of the Public
Safety Contributory System, Ostler made member contributions, which were immediately
vested and credited to him by URS. R. 652. Ostler' s employers made employer
@)

contributions that were placed in the trust fund. R. 651. In August 1990, having
terminated from public employment, Ostler requested and received a refund of his
member contributions from URS in the amount of approximately $27,000. R. 727. Upon
refund of the member contributions, Ostler forfeited 15.167 years of service in the Public
Safety Contributory System. R. 652. On multiple occasions, URS informed Ostler that if
he paid the redeposit amount of the previously refunded contributions plus interest, he
could restore the forfeited service credit. R. 22, 653, 658, 669, 679. Ostler has admitted
that he knew at the time of the refund that the funds would have to be redeposited with
interest before he would be eligible for those years of retirement service credit. R. 679.
To date, Ostler has not made a redeposit of the refunded member contributions and has,

7
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therefore, not restored the forfeited service credit in the Public Safety Contributory
System. R. 653, 727; Appellant's Br., at 5.
After terminating public safety employment with the Department of Corrections,
Ostler became a member of a noncontributory system, the Public Employees'
Noncontributory Retirement System ("Noncontributory System"), due to his employment
with the Utah Department of Commerce, the Davis Applied Technology Center, and Salt
Lake City Corporation at various intervals between 1988 and 2004. R. 603. Ostler
earned and has been granted 3.352 years of service credit in the Noncontributory System
from this employment. R. 653, 659. This amount of service credit is insufficient, on its
own, to qualify him for a retirement allowance because a member must have four years of
service credit to qualify for a retirement allowance. See Utah Code Ann. § 49-13401 ( l )( c).
Despite his forfeiture of Public Safety Contributory service credit and an
insufficient amount of service credit in the Noncontributory System to qualify for a
benefit, Ostler seeks to qualify for a retirement allowance. Appellant's Br., at 7-14. Yet
he has declined the statutory remedies available to him-redepositing the refund or
earning more service credit. Id. at 5. If Ostler returns to employment with a URS
participating employer and makes a redeposit of the refunded member contributions and
interest for his Public Safety Contributory service, his service credit in that system would
be restored. See Utah Code Ann.§ 49-l 1-502(l)(c), (3). Alternatively, Ostler could
become employed with a URS participating employer and earn additional service credit
in order to receive enough service credits to qualify for a retirement allowance. See, e.g.,
8
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<i

id. § 49-13-401 (1 ). Under either scenario, once he meets all statutory retirement
conditions, Ostler could then qualify for and receive an allowance because he would have
more than four years of service credit, the minimum period required to qualify for an
allowance in any system covered by the Act. See, e.g., id.
C. Salt Lake Community College

Salt Lake Community College ("SLCC") is a public community college that is a
participating employer with URS. R. 123, 125. SLCC employed Ostler part time from
(j)

1992-1998. R. 407. SLCC did not enroll Ostler with URS, claiming that he was not
eligible to earn service credit because he was not a full-time employee, and therefore not
eligible for retirement benefits. R. 407.
II.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW

Rather than redeposit his refunded member contributions to restore the forfeited
@

service credit or earn additional service credit through new employment, on July 30,
2013, Ostler brought a Request for Board Action before the Board under Utah Code § 4911-613 ("2013 Request"), asking the Board's Adjudicative Hearing Officer ("Hearing
Officer") to ignore the plain language of the statute and grant him a retirement benefit
without a legal basis. R. 1. In his 2013 Request, Ostler asserted two claims: first, for
service credit based on the portion of employer contributions remaining with URS from
his years in the Public Safety Contributory System; and second, for contributions and
accompanying service credit in the Noncontributory System based on his employment
with SLCC as a contracted, part-time employee. R. 1. As the party responsible for

9
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paying contributions if Ostler's second claim were to be granted, SLCC was eventually
joined to the action as a necessary party. R. 400-01.
SLCC filed a Motion for Summary Judgment against Ostler, asserting that his
claims against SLCC were barred by the statute of limitations and laches. R. 404-05.
The Hearing Officer granted the Motion and dismissed SLCC from the action. R. 56872.
With only his first claim remaining, Ostler then filed a Motion for Summary
Judgment against the Board. R. 599-645. The Board filed a Cross Motion for Summary

•

Judgment. R. 646-91. The Hearing Officer issued a Memorandum Decision denying
Ostler's Motion and granting the Board's Cross Motion, R. 714-17, which was later
memorialized in a formal Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order. R. 724-32.
The Retirement Board then issued a Final Order, adopting the Hearing Officer's
previous decisions (Order Granting SLCC's Motion for Summary Judgment, and
Findings of Undisputed Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Order) as the final board action.
R. 733-53. Within the requisite time period, Ostler appealed the Board's final action to
this Court. See Petitioner's Notice of Claim.
SUMMARY OF THE FACTS
1.

Between 1972 and 1988, Ostler participated as a member of the Public
Safety Contributory Retirement System, codified at Title 49, Chapter 14 of
the Act, through his employment with the Salt Lake County Sherriff' s
Office and the Utah Department of Corrections. R. 5, 603-04, 714, 725-26.
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•

2.

During his public safety employment, Ostler and his employers paid the
certified contributions rates to URS, and Ostler accrued a total of 15 .167
years of service credit in the Public Safety Contributory System. R. 5, 608,
714, 726.

3.

In August 1990, having previously terminated public safety employment,
Ostler requested and received a refund of the total member contributions he
paid to the Public Safety Contributory System, as allowed by the Act. R. 5,
714, 727.

4.

•

Ostler received a refund in the amount of approximately $27,000. R. 5,
605, 714, 727 .

5.

Ostler' s Application for Refund of Contributions provides notice that
service credit will be forfeited when a refund of member contributions is
taken. R. 669, 727.

6.

Ostler has admitted that it was "understood by me that the funds would
have to be re-deposited with interest before I would be eligible for those
years of retirement service." R. 655, 679, 727.

7.

Ostler later participated as a member of the Public Employees'
Noncontributory Retirement System, codified at Title 49, Chapter 13 of the
Act, through employment with the Utah Department of Commerce, Davis
Applied Technology Center, and Salt Lake City Corporation at various
periods between 1988 and 2004. R. 652, 726.

11
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8.

Ostler's employers paid the statutorily required contributions, and Ostler
accrued a total of 3.352 years of service in the Noncontributory System. R.
653, 659.

9.

Ostler was also employed by another participating employer, Salt Lake
Community College, as a part-time employee in various capacities from
1992through 1998. R. 6,725.

10.

Though SLCC participated with URS, SLCC did not enroll Ostler, nor pay
retirement contributions, because SLCC believed Ostler did not meet the
statutory conditions to qualify for retirement contributions as a part-time
employee. R. 6, 33, 34, 408, 488, 553.

11.

Ostler filed suit in the Third District Court against SLCC in 1999, Case No.
990907653, claiming he was owed benefits by SLCC, including state
retirement benefits, among other things. R. 224, 420.

12.

Ostler knew that he was not enrolled with URS at the earliest upon
beginning employment in 1992, and at the latest, in 2001, when he claimed
as a cause of action in his 2nd Amended Complaint that SLCC failed to
provide him retirement benefits as required under Title 49. R. 253.

13.

In 2003, Ostler's district court action against SLCC was dismissed on a
finding that the College was not required to provide the benefits claimed by
Ostler. R. 308.

14.

Upon information and belief, Ostler has not been employed by a
participating employer in Utah since 2004. R. 28.
12
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15.

To date, Ostler has not redeposited funds to URS to reinstate his service
credit.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

I.

THE BOARD CORRECTLY DETERMINED UNDER UT AH LAW THAT
OSTLER FORFEITED ALL SERVICE CREDIT BASED ON THE
REFUND OF HIS MEMBER CONTRIBUTIONS AND WAS THEREFORE
NOT ELIGIBLE FOR A RETIREMENT ALLOWANCE.
Ostler impermissibly seeks service credit based solely on employer contributions

e

in a contributory retirement system. This is an attempt to create a benefit that does not
exist under the law. The Act provides that retirement service credit accrues when "all
required contributions are paid to the office." Id. § 49-11-401 (3 ). In a contributory
system, contributions are required from both employers and members. See id. § 49-14301 ( 1). Thus, to grant service credit based solely on employer contributions would

•

ignore these substantive provisions of the statute .
In addition, under the Act, only "member contributions are credited by the office
to the account of the individual member" and "are vested and nonforfeitable." Id. § 4914-301 (5). There is no provision in the Act to provide a benefit in a contributory system
based on employer contributions alone, nor a mechanism for splitting service credit
attributable to either member or employer contributions. To do so would require this
Court "to fashion a statutory rule out of whole cloth without having any idea of the
legislature's intentions," something that Utah courts have declined to do. Mariemont

Corp. v. White City Water Imp. Dist., 958 P.2d 222, 227 (Utah 1998).
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Ostler has a remedy to obtain a retirement allowance. He can become reemployed
by a participating employer and restore the forfeited service credit by making a full
redeposit of the refunded member contributions or earn additional service credit that
would qualify him for a benefit. Ostler' s failure to do so does not require this Court to
redesign the statute on his behalf.
Finally, legal and policy arguments favor the Board's administration of the statute.
The Board is required to maintain the systems according to law, and the IRS has provided
a determination that the Board's administration of the Public Safety Contributory
Retirement System is in compliance with the Internal Revenue Code. Adopting Ostler's
interpretation could jeopardize the favorable tax advantages that URS can provide as
qualified plans. Ostler' s interpretation would also change the actuarial assumptions
underpinning the level of contribution rates needed to fund the system, which take into
account, for example, members who will elect a refund and otherwise not qualify for a
retirement allowance. To adopt Ostler's interpretation would therefore create an
unfunded new benefit not contemplated by the Legislature, and the Board properly
rejected it.

II.

THE BOARD CORRECTLY DISMISSED OSTLER'S CLAIMS AGAINST
SLCC AS TIME-BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE THREE-YEAR
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR LACHES.
Ostler's claims against SLCC before the Board, brought approximately 15 years

after Ostler' s last day of work with SLCC, were appropriately dismissed by the Board
under the applicable statute of limitations. It was undisputed that the three-year general
statute of limitations found in Utah Code § 78B-2-305(4) applies to Ostler' s claim against
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SLCC. The issue here is when it began to run. "As a general rule, a statute of limitations
begins to run 'upon the happening of the last event necessary to complete the cause of
action."' Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, ,I 20, 108 P.3d 741. In this
matter, all of the elements to determine whether Ostler was eligible and qualified for
@

retirement service credit due to his employment with SLCC existed and could have been
proved or disproved during Ostler's employment with SLCC. The last event creating a
cause of action for service credit would be the payment or non-payment of retirement
contributions by SLCC after each pay period.
The Board's ruling is consistent with the better reasoned decisions of other
jurisdictions. Four state courts have found that the statute of limitations begins to run at
the time the retirement contributions are or should have been made to the applicable
retirement system - typically each pay period. 1 These cases are consistent with the

(jJ)

federal BRISA discovery rule that the statute of limitations begin to run when there is a
"clear repudiation" of benefits that is made known to the beneficiary. See Miller v. Fortis
Benefits Ins. Co., 475 F.3d 516, 520-21 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that beneficiary clearly

knew his benefits had been reduced when he did not receive full payment and was

See Jiricek v. Woonsocket Sch. Dist. #55-4, 489 N.W.2d 348 (S.D. 1992); Lane v. NonTeacher Sch. Employee Ret. Sys. of Missouri, 174 S.W.3d 626, 638 (Mo.App. W.D.
2005); Fishbein v. State ex rel. Louisiana State Univ. Health Sciences Ctr., 898 So.2d
1260, 1266 (La. 2005); Bailey v. Shelby County, 2013 \iVL 2149734 (Tenn. Ct. App.
2013 ).
1
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therefore barred by statute of limitations). While URS plans are not governed by ERIS A,
URS believes that the clear repudiation rule reflects good policy by allowing an
individual an opportunity to discover the harm before acting on it, but not allow an
individual to delay resolution of disputes or wait until evidence is lost or distorted prior to
filing a claim.

•

In addition to being barred by the statute of limitations, the Board's Hearing
Officer correctly ruled that to the extent there are equitable claims brought by Ostler
against SLCC, they are barred by the doctrine of laches. "In Utah, laches traditionally
has two elements: (I) the lack of diligence on the part of the plaintiff and (2) an injury to
defendant owing to such lack of diligence." Fundamentalist Church ofJesus Christ of

Latter-Day Saints v. Home, 2012 UT 66, iJ 29, 289 P .3d 502 (quotation and citation
omitted). The Hearing Officer correctly determined that Ostler had a lack of diligence in
pursuing his claim having known at the latest in 200 I that this was an issue and that
SLCC would be injured by his lack of diligence by having to now pay contributions plus
interest.
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ARGUMENT

I.

ACCORDING TO THE PLAIN AND UNAMBIGUOUS LANGUAGE OF
THE ACT, THE BOARD CORRECTLY REJECTED OSTLER'S
ATTEMPT TO CREATE AN EXTRA-STATUTORY BENEFIT.
A.

Ostler Cannot Qualify for a Retirement Benefit that Does Not Exist
Under the Act.

This Court must affirm the Board's Order, and reject Ostler's request for
retirement service credit based solely on employer contributions in a contributory
<i

retirement system, because Ostler attempts to create a benefit that does not exist under
the law. Because service credit cannot be split based on employer and member
contributions under the Act, the benefit that Ostler is requesting is not provided for under
the plain and unambiguous language of the Act, and Ostler' s attempt to create it was
properly rejected by the Board.
The law regarding statutory construction is well established. When interpreting
statutes, Utah courts look first to the plain language of the statute. "Courts are bound by
the plain language of the statute." Aris Vision Inst., Inc. v. Wasatch Prop. Mgmt., Inc.,
2006 UT 45, ,I 17, 143 P.3d 278. Indeed, "'[t]he judiciary is obligated to interpret
statutes as they are created, not to redesign them."' Id. ,I 17 n.22 (quoting Platts v.
Parents Helping Parents, 947 P.2d 658, 662 (Utah 1997)). Furthermore, "statutory

~

enactments are to be so construed as to render all parts thereof relevant and meaningful."
Perrine v. Kennecott Mining Corp., 911 P.2d 1290, 1292 (Utah 1996) (citation and
internal quotation marks omitted). "'It is our duty to construe each act of the legislature
so as to give it full force and effect."' Bd. of Educ. ofJordan Sch. Dist. v. Sandy City
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Corp., 2004 UT 37, ,I 9, 94 P.3d 234 (quoting Jerz v. Salt Lake County, 822 P.2d 770,
773 (Utah 1991)). "The meaning of a part of an act should harmonize with the purpose
of the whole act. Separate parts ... should not be construed in isolation from the rest of
the act." Jensen v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984).
Ostler's interpretation violates these basic canons of statutory construction in an attempt

•

to redesign the Act to create a benefit not provided for by the Legislature and ignores
substantive provisions that dictate that Ostler does not qualify for a retirement allowance.
The Act's plain language, when read as a whole, shows two crucial principles that
are dispositive here: 1) a member is only granted service credit if ALL the required
retirement contributions, both member and employer contributions, are paid to URS; and
2) only member contributions, not employer contributions, are vested to a member. Each

•

of these provisions is discussed below.
First, service credit is only granted if all the required retirement contributions are
paid to URS. Under the Act, an employee qualifies for a retirement allowance when they
meet a statutory minimum combination of years of service credit and age. For example,
under the Public Safety Contributory System, found in Chapter 14 of the Act, "A member
is qualified to receive an allowance from this system when: ... (i) the member has
accrued at least 20 years of service credit; (ii) the member has accrued at least 10 years of
service credit and has attained an age of 60 years; or (iii) the member has accrued at least
four years of service credit and has attained an age of 65 years." Utah Code Ann. § 4914-401 ( 1)( c ). Service credit is accrued based on employment by a participating employer
when certain conditions are met, including the payment of retirement contributions. The

18

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

•

Act provides, "In the accrual of service credit, the following provisions apply: (a) A
~

person employed and compensated by a participating employer who meets the eligibility
requirements for membership in a system ... shall receive service credit for the term of
the employment provided that all required contributions are paid to the office." Id. § 4911-401(3) (emphasis added); see also id. § 49-l l-102(50)(a) (defining "service credit" as
"the period during which an employee is employed and compensated by a participating
employer and meets the eligibility requirements for membership in a system ... provided
that any required contributions are paid to the office . ... ") (emphasis added). In a

contributory system like the Public Safety Contributory System, both employers and
members pay the contributions. See id. § 49-14-301(1). Thus, in order to earn service
credit in a contributory retirement system for any period of employment, both member
and employer contributions are required. As a result, reading the Act to grant Ostler
~

service credit in a contributory system based solely on employer contributions would
render the language in section 49-11-401 (3) meaningless and is an impermissible
statutory interpretation.
Second, under the Act, only member contributions are vested and nonforfeitable to
the member. The Act provides, "(a) All member contributions are credited by the office
to the account of the individual member. (b) This amount, plus refund interest, is held in
trust for the payment of benefits to the member or the member's beneficiaries. (c) All
member contributions are vested and nonforfeitable." Id. § 49-14-301(5) (emphases

added). In contrast, there are no such provisions for employer contributions. It is
because of the vested nature of member contributions that, under this section of the Act,
19
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members are provided an elective method for receiving a refund of their member
contributions if they terminate employment without retiring. "If a member shall for any
cause, except retirement, permanent or temporary disability, or death, terminate
employment with a participating employer the member may leave the member
contributions in the fund or may receive a refund of the member contributions as
provided under this section." Id. § 49-11-501(1). Such a refund, based on the clear
language of the statute, causes a forfeiture of the corresponding service credits. See id. §
49-11-501(5) ("A member who receives a refund of member contributions forfeits the
service credit based on those contributions."). A member is simply not allowed under the
Act to receive service credit based only on employer contributions under a contributory
retirement system.
However, the statute clearly provides a remedy to reinstate service credit after a
member has taken a refund of member contributions. Once a member has elected to
receive an alternative distribution of benefits through a refund rather than a retirement
allowance, that member may, with later eligible reemployment, reinstate service credit by
redepositing the member contributions, plus interest. "If a member receives a refund of
member contributions and is subsequently reemployed in a position covered by a system .
. . the member may redeposit an amount equal to the member contributions refunded and
interest charged under Section 49-11-503." Id.§ 49-l l-502{l)(a). "If a redeposit is
made, service credit shall be restored to the member's account .... " Id. § 49-11502{l)(c).
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Pursuant to these clear and unambiguous terms of the statute, Ostler left
employment with a participating employer and requested and received a refund of his
member contributions. R. 5, 714, 727. He therefore forfeited the corresponding service
credit.2 He also maintains a clear statutory remedy to receive a retirement benefit for that
period of time, namely, by meeting the statutory parameters to redeposit those funds with
URS. To date, Ostler has declined to make the redeposit. Instead, rather than follow the
statutory provisions for reinstatement of service credit through a redeposit, Ostler seeks a
remedy not provided for by the Legislature-he seeks contributory service credit based
on the employer contributions alone.
Despite the plain language of the statute read as a whole, Ostler argues that
because the refund provision alone states that "a member who receives a refund of
member contributions forfeits the service credit based on those contributions," that there
@

is a way to split the service credit accrued and only forfeit the portion attributable to the
member contributions. However, he does not point to a single statutory provision, a
single Utah case, or even a single case from another jurisdiction that would provide or
support a basis or method for doing that. Were this Court to adopt Ostler's interpretation,
it would have to invent its own method for determining what percentage of service credit
Ostler should retain after taking a refund. The Board's Hearing Officer recognized that

The record demonstrates that Ostler was aware of the consequences of the refund. Not
only did he sign a Refund Application that provided notice that service credit would be
forfeited, but Ostler has admitted that it was "understood by me that the funds would
have to be re-deposited with interest before I would be eligible for those years of
retirement service." R. 655, 679, 727.

2
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•
the statute does not provide for such a split and that he would have to invent a way to do
it. R. 754, Hr'g Tr. 33:7 - 36:2 (discussing ways to calculate Ostler's proposed split
benefit and stating, "if that's what ... the legislature intended, how do I tell them what

•

[is] the legal way to do this? ... What basis is there for me to tell them which way to do
it? ... So it's just up to me? ... My whim?"). Such an exercise is outside the bounds of

•

a court's role in statutory interpretation. "'The judiciary is obligated to interpret statutes
as they are created, not to redesign them."' Aris Vision Inst., Inc., 2006 UT 45, ,I 17 n. 22
(quoting Platts, 947 P.2d at 662). "It is one thing for this court to interpret an ambiguous
statute and attempt to harmonize the various provisions of an act, but it is another for this
court to fashion a statutory rule out of whole cloth without having any idea of the
legislature's intentions." Mariemont C01p. v. White City Water Imp. Dist., 958 P.2d 222,
227 (Utah 1998).
In short, Ostler's interpretation ignores substantive provisions that must be read in
harmony with the provision under which he took a refund and forfeited service credit.
Further, his interpretation would impermissibly create an unfunded, extra-statutory
benefit. As such, the Board properly rejected it.
B.

•

Even If the Act Is Found to Be Ambiguous, the Board's Interpretation
Should Prevail.

Contrary to Ostler's argument, the plain language of the Act unambiguously
provides that both employer and member contributions are required in order to accrue
service credit in a contributory system. Just because Ostler attempts to distort the plain
language with an alternative interpretation, does not make it ambiguous. Indeed, "words
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•
•

and phrases do not qualify as ambiguous simply because one party seeks to endow them
with a different interpretation according to his or her own interests." Saleh v. Farmers
Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 20, 1 17, 133 P.3d 428. Nevertheless, were this Court to find the

language of the Act ambiguous, the Board's efforts to maintain the tax qualified status of
the systems and general actuarial policy support the Board's interpretation, and thus, any
ambiguity should be resolved in favor of the Board.
The Act plainly requires the Board to "ensure that the systems, plans, programs,
and funds are administered according to law." Utah Code Ann.§ 49-l l-203(l)(c). The
Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") has acknowledged that the Board's administration of
the Act is in compliance with the Internal Revenue Code and regulations for qualified
plans, which is needed in order for the members and employers to enjoy favorable tax
advantages for their retirement benefits. Specifically, the IRS issued a favorable
determination letter on December 17, 2014, affirming the qualified status of the URS
Public Safety Retirement Systems. R. 685-86. A second letter was issued confirming the
qualified status of the Public Employees' Noncontributory System. R. 687-88. Thus, the
Board's consistent administration of the systems and interpretation of the Act keep the
systems as qualified plans under the Internal Revenue Code.
In addition, the Board is required to "maintain, in conjunction with participating
employers and members, the systems, plans, and programs on an actuarially sound basis."
Utah Code Ann.§ 49-l l-203(l)(g). Contrary to Ostler's argument that the employer
contributions on the system would fund his proposed partial retirement benefit, thus
having no financial impact to the system, adopting his interpretation would change a
23
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critical assumption underpinning the calculation of contribution rates and would therefore
create an unfunded extra-statutory benefit. Contribution rates are set based on the current
benefit costs, actuarial assumptions and methods, the Board's funding policy, valuation
of plan liabilities and assets, and reviews of actual plan experience, which are in turn all
based on the current statutory language and the Board's interpretations and practices. If

•

Ostler prevails and a "new" benefit is created, the costs would increase and the unfunded
liability would need to be paid.
In short, any ambiguity found in the statutory language should be resolved in favor
of the Board's interpretation, which is calculated to maintain the qualified plan status and
actuarial soundness of the systems.

C. The Board Correctly Rejected Ostler's Other Legal and Policy
Arguments.
Ostler's other legal and policy arguments are unpersuasive, and the Board
correctly determined that they do not override the plain language of the statute. Ostler

•

makes four other legal and policy arguments against the Board's interpretation that he
forfeited all of his contributory service credit when he took a refund: l) that it is
prohibited by the statutory mandate toward liberal construction of the Act, 2) that it
would result in a gross injustice to Ostler, 3) that it would result in a windfall to other
employers and members of URS at his expense, and 4) that it would result in an unlawful
taking. The Board properly rejected these arguments.
First, Ostler contends that a liberal construction of the statute in favor of maximum
benefits, as required by the Act, dictates that his interpretation be accepted. See Utah
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•

•
Code Ann. § 49-11-103(2) ("This title shall be liberally construed to provide maximum
benefits and protections consistent with sound fiduciary and actuarial principles.").
However, this mandate for "maximum benefits" still operates within the boundaries of
what the plain language of the Act actually allows. Liberal construction does not

•

empower a court to override the plain language of the Act and create a non-existent
benefit.
Second, Ostler' s contention that a gross injustice would result from requiring a
member to forfeit all service credit when member contributions are refunded is untenable.
Ostler misunderstands the law and is incorrect that a member could take a partial refund

•

of their member contributions yet forfeit all of their service credit. URS administers the
Act consistent with state and applicable federal law requirements, such that a refund
consists of all member contributions-a portion is not provided for. Utah Code Ann. §
49-11-501(1) (" ... the member ... may receive a refund of the member contributions ..
."). As such, the amount of service credit forfeited will always be proportional to the
amount refunded. Similarly, when a member makes a redeposit of a refund amount, the
member must redeposit the full amount of the refund. Utah Code Ann.§ 49-l 1-502(l)(a)

("If a member receives a refund of member contributions and is subsequently reemployed

•

in a position covered by a system ... the participating employer or the member may
redeposit an amount equal to the member contributions refunded and interest charged
under section 49-11-503."). Thus, every member receiving a refund is treated the same
way and no "great injustice" results from this action.
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Third, the Board's interpretation does not create a windfall to URS and/or other
employers. A pension plan is akin to an insurance plan, where some insureds will pay
premiums for benefits they never collect, and some insureds will collect benefits in
excess of their premiums paid. This is the nature of the employer contributions. The fact
that Ostler' s employers made contributions to URS which are not used to pay him a
benefit does not create a windfall for URS or mean that the retirement systems are
overfunded. In contrast, Ostler's interpretation would in effect result in a windfall to
Ostler by allowing him to receive a double distribution of retirement benefits. Under the
Act, members have access to one of three forms of distributions, each requiring certain
statutory conditions be met: ( 1) a retirement allowance, (2) death benefit, and (3) refund.
Ostler chose to receive a refund and is therefore ineligible to receive another form of
distribution based on the same period of service. If he can now elect to receive both a
refund and a retirement allowance, it would give him a windfall and harm the other
members of the system.
Finally, the forfeiture of service credit provision in the Act does not effect an
unconstitutional taking. As an initial matter, this Court need not address Ostler's
constitutional takings argument because it was inadequately briefed. See Utah Rule of
Appellate Procedure 24(a)(9) (requiring an appellant's argument to "contain the
contentions and reasons of the appellant with respect to the issues presented ... with
citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of the record relied on."); see also Kramer

v. State Ret. Bd., 2008 UT App 351, ~ 22, 195 P.3d 925 (quoting West Jordan City v.
Goodman, 2006 UT 27, ~ 29, 135 P.3d 874) ('"A brief must go beyond providing
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•
conclusory statements and fully identify, analyze, and cite to its legal arguments. This
analysis requires not just bald citation to authority but development of that authority and
reasoned analysis based on that authority."') Here, Ostler relies on no supporting case
law, nor does he provide any meaningful analysis of how his claim meets the required
Ill

elements under Utah law.
Regardless, Ostler could not meet the elements required to demonstrate a
constitutional taking. "' A takings claim presents two distinct inquiries: 'First, the
claimant must demonstrate some [protectable] interest in property. If the claimant
possesses a [protectable] property interest, the claimant must then show that the interest

•

has been taken or damaged by government action."' Harold Selman, Inc. v. Box Elder

County, 2011 UT 18, ,I 23,251 P.3d 804 (quoting View Condo. Owners Ass 'n v. MS/CO,

L.L. C., 2005 UT 91, ,I 30, 127 P .3d 697) (alterations in original). Ostler fails to meet the
I)

first element, because under the Act he had no protectable property interest in the
employer contributions that remained with URS after he took a refund of his member
contributions. Even if he qualified for a retirement allowance, he has a claim on the fund,
but not a property interest in the specific employer contributions. Without a property
interest, there can be no taking. Thus, even if this Court deigned to address Ostler' s

•

inadequately briefed argument, a constitutional taking under Utah law could not be
established.
In short, the Court should affirm the Board's Order in this matter because to
accept Ostler's interpretation of the Act would be to create a benefit-contributory
service credit based on employer contributions alone-that does not exist in statute. The
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Legislature clearly did not intend for such a benefit, and this Court should not go beyond
the plain, unambiguous language of the statute to create it.

II.

THE BOARD CORRECTLY DISMISSED OSTLER'S CLAIMS AGAINST
SLCC AS TIME-BARRED BY THE APPLICABLE THREE-YEAR
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS OR LACHES.

Ostler's claims against SLCC before the Board, brought approximately 15 years
'
after Mr. Ostler's last day of work with SLCC, were appropriately dismissed by the

•
•

Board under the applicable statute of limitations and the doctrine of !aches. 3 The Board
specifically held that the statute of limitations on a claim for retirement service credit
begins to run at the time the employer should have made retiremeQ.t contributions to URS

...

but failed to do so. For the following reasons, this Court should affirm the Board's
ruling.

A.

The Board Correctly Determined the Statute of Li:111itations Began to
Run at the Time Retirement Contributions Should Have Been Made to
URS in Accordance with Utah Law.

The Hearing Officer correctly held, and the Board approved, that the three-year
general statute oflimitations found in Utah Code section 788-2-305(4) applies to Ostler's
claim against SLCC and began to run at the time that SLCC should have made retirement
contributions to URS. This Court should affirm the Board's ruling because it is: 1)
consistent with the Board's previous rulings, 2) in accordance with Utah law and the best

Because the Board determined in summary judgment that Ostler's claim against SLCC
was barred, the underlying merits of his claim were never litigated. If Ostler is allowed
to bring his claim against SLCC, this Court must remand the issue to the Board for a
determination on whether Ostler was actually eligible for service credit through his
employment with SLCC.

3
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•

reasoned cases from other jurisdictions, and 3) in accordance with public policy
~

regarding the statute of limitations.
1. Ostler' s Claim for Service Credit Is Consistent with and Informed by
Previous Board Rulings.

•

URS has had several recent cases before the Board, and an additional one
presently before this Court, that have informed URS' actions in regards to the statute of
limitations in retirement benefit cases and which URS believes will help inform the
Court's decision here. Prior to 2013, it had been URS' practice for many years to request
and collect past due retirement contributions from employers without any time limitation,
believing that any applicable statute of limitations on such claims was tolled under the
equitable discovery rule. Consistent with this practice, URS brought several Board
Actions against participating employers for past retirement contributions due.
Of most significance, the Board brought an action against Kane County Hospital, a
special service district, for its failure to pay retirement contributions to URS for its
employees between 1992 and 2009. See Ramsay v. Kane County Hospital, Case No.
20150574, Appellant's Br., at 8-9. The Hospital subsequently brought a Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment to limit the claims of URS based on the applicable statute of
limitations. URS defended its practice, arguing that the statute of limitations should be
tolled under the equitable discovery rule until URS discovered the Hospital should have
been a participating employer with URS. Id. at 9. Nevertheless, the Board's Hearing
Officer ruled that the statute of limitations on URS' claims to receive retirement
contributions was not tolled under the equitable discovery rule because URS had not
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proven either "concealment" or "exceptional circumstances" as required by common law.

Id. at 9-1 O; see also Russell Packard Dev., Inc. v. Carson, 2005 UT 14, 108 P .3d 741.
Given the clarification by the Hearing Officer regarding the equitable discovery
rule, URS accepted and did not appeal the decision. However, two of the employees of
Kane County Hospital have pursued an appeal that is currently before this Court in

Ramsay v. Kane County Hospital, with oral argument on August 31, 2016. See Appellate
Case No. 20150574.
Following the Hearing Officer's ruling in the Kane County Hospital matter, the
Board clarified the application of the Hearing Officer's decision to URS by passing
Board Resolution 2013-04. See Addendum 1. The Resolution was not an attempt to
change the law (something the Board has no power to do here), but rather clarified for
URS staff how to treat employer retirement contributions under the applicable statute of
limitations. The Resolution affirmed the application of the three-year statute of
limitations found in Utah Code section 78B-2-305 for claims brought before the Board
and established that such a claim arises "when a payment is or should have been paid,
service credit is or should have been granted, notice is or should have been provided, or a
claim is or should have been made." Id. Thus, since 2013, even if URS has believed that
it was owed more contributions under Utah law, URS has only requested three years of
retirement contributions from employers pursuant to the applicable statute of limitations.
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•

The Board's decision in the instant matter came after the Ramsay decision, Ostler
having filed his claim on July 30, 2013. 4 The Board therefore applied the three-year
statute of limitations from the time that the payments should have been made on Ostler's
behalf. Given this background, the Board in this matter, through its Hearing Officer,
consistently applied the statute of limitations in accordance with the precedent set in
previous cases.
2. Utah Case Law Is Consistent with the Board's Order on the Statute of
Limitations.
Utah Appellate Courts have not directly ruled on when the statute of limitations
begins to run in a claim for retirement service credit. However, the Board's holding that
the statute begins to run at the time retirement contributions are due is consistent with
Utah Court's previous rulings on the applicability of the statute of limitations.

5

"As a general rule, a statute of limitations begins to run 'upon the happening of the
last event necessary to complete the cause of action."' Russell Packard Dev., Inc., 2005
UT 14,120. More recently, the Utah Supreme Court has held," ... a cause of action
Although not specifically applicable in this case, the Legislature passed HB 25 in
2016, which created a specific four-year statute of limitations for a claim brought
under the Retirement Act, defined when such a cause of action accrues, and
provided for statutory tolling in certain circumstances. See Utah Code Ann. § 4911-613 .5, attached as Addendum 2.

4

s The statute of limitations for liability based on a statute states, "An action may be

brought within three years ... for a liability created by the statutes of this state .... "
Utah Code Ann. § 788-2-305(4). The parties appear to be in agreement that this threeyear statute of limitations applies to Ostler's claims. See, e.g., Appellant's Br., at 15-17
(failing to dispute the Hearing Officer's specific finding that the three-year statute of
limitations based on liability under a statute applies). Based on the lack of argument to
the contrary, the Board presumes that Ostler is in agreement that the application of this
particular statute of limitations is correct.
31
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accrues when 'it becomes remediable in the courts' - or, in other words, when 'all of the
elements that must be proved at trial under the statute allegedly creating liability on the
part of the defendant are existing and may be established."' Flowell Elec. Ass 'n, Inc. v.

Rhodes Pump, 2015 UT 87, if 12,361 P.3d 91 (quoting State v. Huntington-Cleveland
Irrigation Co., 2002 UT 75, if 24, 52 P.3d 1257). In this matter, all of the elements to

•

determine whether Ostler was eligible and qualified for retirement service credit due to
his employment with SLCC existed and could be proved or disproved during Ostler's
employment with SLCC.
In order to be eligible for service credit in the Public Employees' Noncontributory
Retirement System, the retirement system potentially applicable to Ostler' s employment
with SLCC, he must have worked in a position averaging 20 or more hours per week and
received benefits normally provided to other employees. See Utah Code Ann. § 49-13102(5)(a) (defining a "regular full-time employee"). If Ostler was eligible for service
credit for his employment with SLCC, SLCC would have been required to report his
salary to URS and remit employer contributions to URS within 60 days of each pay
period. See id. § 49-11-60 I and -603. When retirement contributions for any given pay
period were received, URS would then have granted service credit for the fraction of a
year reflecting that pay period. See id. § 49-11-102(50) (defining "service credit").
Whether Ostler worked the number of hours to be eligible for service credit or whether
SLCC made the required retirement contributions to URS are all facts that were existing
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•

at the time of Ostler's employment with SLCC. 6 The last event creating a cause of action
for service credit would be the payment or non-payment of retirement contributions by
SLCC after each pay period. Thus, the statute of limitations began to run for Ostler at the
time SLCC would have been required to make retirement contributions to URS, but did
not make those payments.
3. The Board's Ruling That on a Claim for Service Credit the Statute of
Limitations Begins to Run Upon Retirement Contributions Being Due Is
Consistent with the Better Reasoned Decisions from Other Jurisdictions.
Although Utah Courts have yet to address the statute of limitations in the state
retirement context for accrual of service credit, the Board's ruling is consistent with the

•

better reasoned decisions of other jurisdictions and should be affirmed. Despite Ostler's
implications to the contrary, Courts from other jurisdictions are split on this issuewhether the statute of limitations begins to run at the time retirement contributions should

t)

have been paid to the retirement system (typically these are paid every pay period), or
whether it only begins to run when an employee meets all the criteria to retire and receive
a benefit. In South Dakota, Missouri, Louisiana, and Tennessee, courts have found that
the statute of limitations begins to run before retirement either at the time the retirement
contributions are or should have been made to the applicable retirement systemtypically each pay period-or when the employee is otherwise on notice. 7 In particular,

These are also facts that were not decided by the Board. R. 568-72. Were this Court to
determine that Ostler's claim against SLCC is not barred, the claim would need to be
remanded for a determination of whether he actually met the requirements for eligibility.

6

See Jiricek v. Woonsocket School District #55-4, 489 N. W.2d 348 (S.D. 1992) (finding
statute of limitations begins to run when retirement contributions should have been paid

7
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the Lane v. Non-Teacher School Employee Retirement System of Missouri, 174 S.W.3d
626, 638 (Mo. Ct. App. 2005), decision follows the federal ERISA rule that the statute of

c.

limitations begins to run when there is a "clear repudiation" of benefits that is made
known to the beneficiary, regardless of whether the benefit was actually paid or denied.
See Miller v. Fortis Benefits Ins. Co., 475 F.3d 516, 520-21 (3d Cir. 2007) (holding that
beneficiary clearly knew his benefits had been reduced when he did not receive full
payment and was therefore barred by statute oflimitations). Although URS is not
governed by ERISA, the Board believes that the applicable state cases and the ERISA
"clear repudiation" rule reflect the best policy here. The clear repudiation rule would
allow an individual an opportunity to discover the harm before acting on it, but not allow
an individual to delay resolution of disputes or wait until evidence is lost or distorted
prior to filing a claim.

by employer as meeting the policy purposes of statute of limitations); Lane v. NonTeacher School Employee Retirement System of Missouri, 174 S.W.3d 626, 638
(Mo.App. W.D. 2005) (statute of limitations begins to run at retirement, "unless the
claimant knew or should have known from an event or circumstance that a clear
repudiation of those benefits or rights has occurred." ); Fishbein v. State ex rel. Louisiana
State Univ. Health Sciences Center, 898 So.2d 1260, 1266 (La. 2005) (finding that
employee could only recover three years of retirement contributions from pension plan
because statute of limitations prescriptive period began to run in each pay period when
salary was not reported and retirement contributions were not made); Bailey v. Shelby
County, 2013 WL 2149734 {Tenn. Ct. App. 2013) (finding statute of limitations began to
run when employees were on reasonable notice of claims prior to retirement).
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9

•
In contrast to the clear federal ERISA rule and the well articulated state cases,
California, Ohio, and New Hampshire courts have held that regardless of any knowledge
of a repudiation of benefits, the statute of limitations does not begin to run until the
benefit is actually payable, i.e. the date of retirement or death. 8 These cases are similar to
•

Ostler's argument that an individual must have suffered actual damages prior to the
statute of limitations beginning to run. 9 In addition to these cases, state courts in

8

•
•

See Cal. Teachers' Ass 'n v. Governing Bd., 169 Cal.App.3d 35, 44 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985)

("We hold that teachers' entitlement to service credits would not accrue until retirement
benefits became payable upon retirement and, since service credits are dependent in part
upon employer contributions, teachers' right to compel District to make additional
contributions to the Teachers' Retirement Fund likewise accrues only upon retirement.");
State ex rel. Teamsters v. City of Youngstown, 364 N.E.2d 18, 20 (Ohio 1977) (finding
statute of limitations did not begin to run until employee's right to receive a benefit was
actually infringed at time of retirement); Wagner v. B.F. Goodrich Co., 1991 WL 184489
(Ohio Ct. App. 1991) (holding statute of limitations begins to run on the date of
retirement); State Employees' Ass 'n v. Belknap Cnty., 448 A.2d 969 (N.H. 1982)
(determining that statute of limitations begins to run at the time of retirement or death
when benefits become payable). Of note, the most recent of these cases is 1991,
approximately 25 years ago, and it certainly seems as if the common law has been refined
since the time of these cases.
Although Ostler correctly stated that the Utah Supreme Court found that a statute begins
to run when a plaintiff has suffered "damages," it also appears that the requirement of
"damages" to be found prior to the limitations period beginning run is specifically
qualified by the word "generally." See State v. Huntington-Cleveland Irrigation Co.,
2002 UT 75, ,r 24, 52 P.3d 1257. Most Utah courts have applied the more common
maxim that the statute begins to run when there is "actual harm" or a clear case in
controversy. See, e.g., Seale v. Gowans, 923 P.2d 1361, 1364 (Utah 1996) ("Until a
plaintiff suffers actual harm or damages, the limitations period will not accrue.") For
example, Utah Courts have allowed a statute of limitations to run in declaratory actions,
even where no damages have accrued but when the facts are known and there is a clear
case in controversy. See, e.g., Quick Safe-T Hitch, Inc. v. RSB Sys., L. C., 2000 UT 84, ,r
15, 12 P.3d 577 (determining four-year general statute of limitations applied to
declaratory action seeking to quiet title in patent license). Thus, the Court has recognized
times when damages may not have accrued, but the statute would begin to run. A request
9

•

•
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Oklahoma and Washington, including several cases cited by Ostler, have held that the
statute of limitations begins to run at retirement/or benefits which were calculated at
retirement. These cases are clearly distinguishable from the "service credit" cases
because in the Oklahoma and Washington cases, the claim was not known until the time
of retirement and could not have accrued before that time when the facts were
unknown. 10
Despite the split in state jurisdictions, the Board was correct in applying the statute
of limitations from the time retirement contributions should be paid by the employer so
long as the employee is or should reasonably have discovered the payment (or
nonpayment) of retirement contributions. 11 Not only is it consistent with the Utah rule of

for retirement service credit is a similar type exception to the general maxim that
damages are required prior to the statute running.
See Bordwine v. Okla. Firefighters Pension and Ret. Sys., 99 P.3d 703, 705 (Okla. Civ.
App. 2004) ("The statute of limitations on such a claim against OFPRS begins to run
when a member acquires the right to sue, that is, when the pensioner knew or should have
known that OFPRS failed to pay the benefits required to be paid at the time of retirement
when the right to benefits became fixed."); Steelman v. Okla. Police Pension and Ret.
Sys., 128 P.3d 1090, 1096 (Okla. Civ. App. 2005) (holding that statute of limitations
begins to run upon vesting of retirement benefits, which is when employee retires, but
may accrue in certain circumstances when employee first acquires notice of facts to
support claim); Wash. Educ. Ass 'n v. Wash. Dep 't ofRet. Sys., 332 P.3d 439,446 (Wash.
2014) (finding statute oflimitations starts at the latest at the time of retirement when
requesting additional retirement benefits); Bowles v. Wash. Dept. of Ret. Sys., 84 7 P .2d
440 (Wash. 1993) (holding statute of limitations runs at retirement for increased benefits,
but in the context of including lump sum payments for unused vacation and sick leave it
runs at time of retirement calculation).
10

Whether and which discovery rule might apply to toll the statute of limitations in a
claim for retirement service credit is also an open question that is the subject of the
Ramsay v. Kane County Hospital matter before this Court. Here, Ostler has not argued
that a discovery rule should toll the statute of limitations because he sued SLCC in
11
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law and federal ERISA cases on statutes of limitations, but the policy reasons
undergirding a statute oflimitations, as established by Utah law, are best accomplished
by encouraging the employee to promptly act on a claim rather than sitting on it, despite
knowledge thereof, until retirement.
In addition, holding that the statute of limitations does not begin to run until
retirement could lead to inconsistent appellate decisions because Utah Courts have
previously decided such issues in advance of retirement. Although Utah Courts have not
addressed the statute of limitations issue in a retirement service credit context directly,
the URS administrative hearing process has determined multiple actions over the years

•

regarding employees' benefits prior to retirement, and this Court and the Utah Supreme
Court also have ruled on multiple retirement benefit cases prior to an employee being
eligible to retire. See, e.g., Whitaker v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 2008 UT App 282, 191 P.3d

•

814 (holding employee could not earn more than one year of service credit during one
calendar year); 0 'Keefe v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 929 P .2d 1112 (Utah Ct. App. 1996)
(finding GAP time payment should not be included in final average salary for public
safety officer), aff'd, 956 P.2d 279 (Utah 1998); McLeod v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 2011 UT
App 190,257 P.3d 1090 (affirming Board determination of process to calculate
retirement benefits under statute for public safety officer); Horton v. Utah State Ret. Bd.,
842 P.2d 928 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) (finding employee required to participate in

district court in 1999 requesting service credit. R. 224, 420. This suit makes it clear that
Ostler was on reasonable notice of a potential claim. As the discovery rule was not
argued by Ostler, URS will not discuss the potential application of a discovery rule here.
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noncontributory retirement system rather than contributory retirement system after
changing employers); Epperson v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 949 P .2d 779 (Utah Ct. App.
1997) (holding retiree's former spouse would be eligible for death benefit if retiree died
regardless of whether retiree was remarried at time of death). URS allowed these cases at
the time, rather than arguing they were not ripe for appeal, in furtherance of the policy
behind the statutes of limitation, which, as the U.S. Supreme Court has stated, "are
designed to promote justice by preventing surprises through the revival of claims that
have been allowed to slumber until evidence has been lost, memories have faded, and
witnesses have disappeared." Order of R.R. Telegraphers v. Ry. Express Agency, Inc.,
321 U.S. 342, 348-49 (1944),followed by Myers v. McDonald, 635 P.2d 84, 86 (Utah
1981 ). If this Court determines that a cause of action for service credit does not accrue
until retirement, it follows that the claims would not have been ripe for decision. If so,
the effect of finding that the statute of limitations had not run is that the Board and Utah
courts, by implication, should not have ruled on the previous retirement claims decided
prior to retirement.
According to this logic, accepting Ostler' s argument would also lead to the absurd
result of not only allowing, but potentially requiring an employee with full knowledge of
an issue to wait in uncertainty on their retirement benefits, being unable to bring a claim
until their benefits "might" come due. Allowing employees to bring claims in advance of
retirement was also an effort by URS and Utah courts to give the employee some
certainty concerning their retirement benefits so that they would not make irrevocable
decisions concerning their employment based on incorrect assumptions regarding their
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retirement benefits. See Eldredge v. Utah State Ret. Bd., 795 P .2d 671, 676 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) (requiring URS to provide correct retirement information to employees).
Thus, allowing an employee to wait until retirement for a service credit claim to become
ripe would lead to an unjust and impractical result.
While it is true that there is not case law in Utah that is directly applicable, the
Board was correct in holding that the limitations period commences when retirement
contributions are due. This holding is consistent with Utah law and the better reasoned
cases of other jurisdictions and will protect the public employees by giving greater
certainty to retirement benefits going forward. This Court should thus affirm the Board's
ruling that the statute of limitations in a request for retirement service credit begins to run
from the time that the employer failed to pay the required retirement contributions.

B. The Board Also Correctly Determined That Ostler's Claims Are Barred
by the Doctrine of Laches.
The Board correctly ruled that to the extent there are equitable claims brought by
Ostler against SLCC, they are barred by the doctrine of laches. This Court need not reach
the issue of laches because the statute of limitations is dispositive of all claims against
SLCC before the Board. However, if the Court does reach the laches issue, it should
affirm the Hearing Officer's ruling.
"In Utah, laches traditionally has two elements: ( 1) the lack of diligence on the
part of the plaintiff and (2) an injury to defendant owing to such lack of diligence."
Fundamentalist Church ofJesus Christ ofLatter-Day Saints v. Home, 2012 UT 66, ,r 29,
289 P.3d 502 (quotation and citation omitted). The Hearing Officer correctly determined
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that Ostler had a lack of diligence in pursuing his claim, and that SLCC would be injured
by his lack of diligence.
First, Ostler knew in at least 2001 when he filed a 2 nd Amended Complaint for
service credit in Utah District Court that SLCC had not paid his retirement contributions
and he had not been granted service credit for his employment. R. 253. He did not file
his Request for Board Action in this matter until 2013, approximately 12 years after that
date. R. 1. There is nothing in the record to provide any reasonable explanation as to
why it took so long to file this action.
Second, if SLCC is found to be liable for Ostler' s service credit, SLCC would be
required to repay URS retirement contributions, plus interest and penalties under Utah
Code section 49-11-601 (3) which states,
(3) ... if a participating employer does not make the contributions required by this
title within 30 days of the end of the pay period, the participating employer is
liable to the office ... for:
(a) delinquent contributions;
(b) interest on the delinquent contributions ... ; and
(c) a penalty equal to the greater of:
(i) $250; or
(ii) 50% of the total contributions for the employees for the period of the
reporting error."
Therefore, the harm to SLCC would be the interest calculation at the actuarially assumed
rate of return for retirement funds, and the penalties associated with those contributions.
Although the specific dollar amount of the harm has not been calculated, this Court must
recognize that there would be a harm. As such, the Board correctly determined that the
doctrine of !aches would apply to Ostler's claims and correctly dismissed his action
against SLCC before the Board.
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In sum, this Court should apply the three-year statute of limitations to Ostler' s

•

claim against SLCC as having run from the date SLCC should have paid contributions on
his behalf, rather than allowing him to sit on his claim until retirement. Also, to the
extent his claims are equitable in nature, the doctrine of laches was properly found to bar
his claim. In any event, the underlying merits of Ostler's claim have not been litigated,
and should Ostler be allowed to bring a claim against SLCC, that claim would be
properly remanded to the Board for a determination of Ostler's eligibility under the Act.
CONCLUSION
This Court should affirm the Board's Order denying Ostler a benefit which does
not exist under Utah law. The plain language of the Act does not allow Ostler to receive
service credit based solely on employer contributions in a contributory retirement system.
Further, Ostler has a remedy to receive retirement benefits if he qualifies and redeposits

•

the funds that he has withdrawn from URS.
Additionaly, this Court should also affirm the Board's conclusions that Ostler
failed to bring a timely claim against SLCC for retirement contributions. Ostler' s claims
against SLCC, brought approximately 15 years after Ostler's last day of work with
SLCC, were appropriately dismissed by the Board under the applicable statute of
limitations and laches.

~

DA TED this

~

day of September, 2016.

~:811~
David B. Hansen
Associate General Counsel
Utah State Retirement Systems
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Addendum 1
Board Resolution 2013-04
@

@
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RESOLUTION #2013-04 GRANTING SERVICE CREDIT AFTER EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
(Clarifies Resolution #2004-11)

September 13, 2013
WHEREAS, Utah Code Annotated § 49-11-401(3)(c) provides that the Utah Retirement and
Insurance Benefit Act allows the Utah State Retirement Board ("Board") to fix the minimum
time per day, per month, and per year upon the basis of which one year of service and
proportionate parts of a year shall be credited toward qualification for retirement; and
WHEREAS, employers participating with Utah Retirement Systems will occasionally take
incorrect employment action in terminating or otherwise limiting employment; and
WHEREAS, the Board desires to clarify Resolution 04-11 in regards to granting service credit or
other adjustments or contributions made to the Utah State Retirement Office under a judgment
or settlement agreement in an employment dispute; and

@)

WHEREAS, Utah Code Annotated § 49-11-401(4) allows the Utah State Retirement Office
("Office") to estimate the amount of service credit, compensation, or age of any member
participant, or alternate payee, if information is not contained in the records; and
WHEREAS, the Board desires to clarify and update the requirements needed in a judgment or
settlement agreement from an employment dispute in order for the Board to grant service
credit for time not actually worked, or to make other adjustments for contributions made to
the Office.
NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED, that in order to both protect the actuarial soundness of
the retirement systems and to allow for benefits to be granted when an employee is involved in
an employment dispute, the Board makes the following rules. A member may qualify for
service credit following a judgment or settlement agreement in an employment dispute only
when all of the following requirements are met:

1.

The judgment or settlement agreement must contemplate that the employee
would have actually worked during a specific period of time in the past and
include those dates;

2.

The judgment or settlement agreement must require payment of retirement
contributions in full, as determined by the Office, for that specific period of time,
which must be in the past;
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RESOLUTION #2013-04 GRANTING SERVICE CREDIT AFTER EMPLOYMENT DISPUTES
(CONTINUED)
(Clarifies Resolution #2004-11)

3.

•

The Office shall calculate the retirement contributions to be paid on:
a.

Salary that is the greater of:
i. the most recent hourly rate; or
ii. the highest hourly rate earned in the last full calendar year the
employee actually worked; and

b. The number of hours worked that is the greater of:
i. the most recent number of hours the employee was scheduled to
work each pay period (i.e. 80 hours per pay period); or
ii. the highest number of hours worked by the employee in the last full
calendar year the employee actually worked;
4.

The employer, employee, or the employer and employee combined have paid all
the required retirement contributions as determined by the Office;

5.

The employer is adjudicated or admits to some error or fault in the employment
action, and any settlement is not merely a release of claims; and

6.

The service credit requested otherwise meets all the other legal requirements
for service credit. (i.e. an individual cannot receive more than one year of
service credit during any one-year period.)

NOW, THEREFORE, BE IT FURTHER RESOLVED, that any adjustments or contributions made to a
Defined Contribution Plan due to a settlement agreement must be in accordance with both
state and federal law, including any regulations promulgated thereby, and the rules set forth in
the Plan's governing document.

This resolution shall take effect on September 13, 2013
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Addendum2
Utah Code Ann. § 49-11-613.5
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§ 49-11-613.5. Limitation of actions--Cause of action, UT ST§ 49-11-613.5

@

IWest's Utah Code Annotated

ITitle 49. Utah State Retirement and Insurance Benefit Act (Refs & Annos)
IChapter 11. Utah State Retirement Systems Administration

IPart 6. Procedures and Records
U.C.A. 1953 § 49-11-613.5
§ 49-11-613.5. Limitation of actions--Cause of action
Currentness

(1) Subject to the procedures provided in Section 49-1 1-613 and except as provided in Subsection (3 ), an action regarding a
benefit, right, obligation, or employment right brought under this title may be commenced only within four years of the date
that the cause of action accrues.

(2)(a) A cause of action accrues under this title and the limitation period in this section runs from the date when the aggrieved
party became aware, or through the exercise of reasonable diligence should have become aware, of the facts giving rise to the
cause of action, including when:
(i) a benefit, right, or employment right is or should have been granted;

(ii) a payment is or should have been made; or

(iii) an obligation is or should have been performed.

(b) If a claim involves a retirement service credit issue under this title:

(i) a cause of action specifically accrues at the time the requisite retirement contributions relating to that retirement
service credit are paid or should have been paid to the office; and

(ii) the person is deemed to be on notice of the payment or nonpayment of those retirement contributions.

(3) If an aggrieved party fails to discover the facts giving rise to the cause of action due to misrepresentation, fraud,
intentional nondisclosure, or other affirmative steps to conceal the cause of action, a limitation period prescribed in this
section does not begin to run until the aggrieved party actually discovers the existence of the cause of action.

(4) The person claiming a benefit, right, obligation, or employment right arising under this title has the burden of bringing the
action within the period prescribed in this section.

(5) Nothing in this section relieves a member, retiree, part1c1pant, alternative payee, covered individual, employer,
participating employer, or covered employer of the obligations under this title.
(6) The office is not required to bring a claim on behalf of a member, retiree, participant, alternative payee, covered
individual, employer, participating employer, or covered employer.
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(7)(a) A limitation period provided in this section does not apply to actions for which a specific limit is otherwise specified in
this title or by contract, including master policies or other insurance contracts.

(b) For actions arising under this title, this section supersedes any applicable limitation period provided in Title 78B,
Chapter 2, Statutes of Limitations.
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